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# NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW

AUGUST, 1918

## “CONSTRUCTIVE CRITICISM”

*“To attain ideals, you must at times smash idols.”—*  
NORTH AMERICAN REVIEW.

BY THE EDITOR

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WE have never yet known a public official who did not profess to welcome honest criticism and we cannot recall one who did not resent it when applied to his own activities. Formerly objection was made commonly to its presumed “injustice and unfairness,” but of late it has fallen under the ban of those most directly concerned as lacking in suggestion which might point the way to improvement. To be acceptable nowadays, particularly to those members of our present Administration who are unduly sensitive or admittedly incompetent, or both, criticism must be not only “just and fair,” but “constructive, not destructive,” they themselves, of course, being vested with the right of discriminative judgment.

Perhaps we should add immediately that we have not our Chief Magistrate in mind in this connection. Long ago he declared plainly that he could “imagine no greater disservice” than “to deny to the people of a free republic like our own” their indisputable prerogatives, and he added that “while exercising the great powers of the office I hold, I would regret in the crisis like the one through which we are now passing to lose the benefit of patriotic and intelligent criticism.” So far as we have been able to judge from afar, although with sight as yet undimmed, he has maintained this attitude with a steadiness, even a serenity, which must be remarked as truly noteworthy,—a circumstance, we are bound to say, as fortunate for the country as it obviously is

creditable to the individual, since never before perhaps in our history has a true perspective been so highly desirable as an attribute of a Chief Executive.

It is not, then, the President, but his underlings, or such of them as feel that, because they breathe what they have come to regard as the atmosphere of sacrosanctitude, they, too, can do no wrong, to whom we would make reference, designed to be at least helpful and even stimulating to their respective spirits. Inevitably the most glowing example of inept smartness to occur to one's mind is afforded by Mr. George Creel because, not only of the many ridiculous statements which have dropped from his careless tongue like unripe peas from an overcharged pod, but also because his was the first grave offense. It is not his famous "elaboration" of the report of Admiral Gleaves a year or more ago, reprehensible and shocking though it was, that now concerns us; it is the attitude which he promptly and indignantly assumed respecting what he had done. It will be recalled that, immediately upon the publication of Mr. Creel's fabrication, the Associated Press in Washington received a message from one of its correspondents in England giving as the official view at the base of the United States flotilla that no such remarkable happening as he had depicted had taken place. The Associated Press meekly withdrew the dispatch by request of the Navy Department, but too late to prevent its publication in a number of newspapers. Whereupon Mr. Creel, while forced to admit that he had "elaborated" the Admiral's report, which, incidentally has not been printed to this day, violently denounced the correspondent for telling the truth. We quote from the *World* of July 6, 1917:

"I am going over to the Navy Department and advise Secretary Daniels to pay no attention whatever to these nasty reports from this unpatriotic man," Mr. Creel said with much warmth. "Nothing that has happened since the war began has aroused the patriotism of the American people as much as this Fourth of July announcement," he continued, in referring to the version of the submarine attack written by himself. "If everything that this country does during the war is to be subjected to attack by nasty newspapers we might as well begin right here to put an end to the discussion by paying no attention to them."

"Why not confound the author of this report by printing the text of the official announcement from Admiral Gleaves?" Mr. Creel was asked.

"The nasty papers would even try to discredit that if we were to publish it," said Mr. Creel, his warmth waxing. "If we begin to pub-

lish official reports the Germans would know just where the attack was made and repulsed and then they would know where the transports rendezvoused.”

Passing as mere evidence of immaturity and cranial enlargement the diverting appellation applied to American public journals, we find that Mr. Creel's justification of his conduct rested upon two grounds,—first, that he was warranted in deceiving the people for the purpose of arousing their patriotism and, secondly, that the publication of the facts might give to the enemy information of which necessarily they were already in possession. “If everything that this country does during the war is to be attacked,” has now the familiar ring of many subsequent utterances, which have served to cloak doubtful practices, but it was novel at the time and may rightfully be regarded as the original declaration of a policy which has since undergone somewhat drastic treatment and seems now to be in a fair way to a complete cure if the inherent tendency of the head of the War Department can finally be overcome.

That Mr. Creel should have referred to himself as “the country” can hardly be regarded as a mere inadvertence, in the light of his later matured assumptions of the position of “the Government,” but the error has since become so common on the part of some of his nominal superiors that its significance long ago ceased to be unique or even peculiar. How far or in what direction Mr. Creel's energetic ego might have projected the country, the Government and himself if he had not overstepped all bounds by speaking of the halls of legislation as slums we shall never know; suffice it for the nonce to say that when he appeared before the Congress and quoted quite pathetically, although in less euphonious phrase—

“Don't view me with a critic's eye,  
But pass my imperfections by;  
Large streams from little fountains flow,  
Tall oaks from little acorns grow,”—

all was forgiven and he was put upon an allowance of \$1,600,000 a year, greatly, we suspect, to the relief of the President, who hitherto had been obliged to provide, from his own special fund, food and clothing and movie tickets to Mr. Creel and his whole tribe. We may, we think, safely leave Mr. Creel, for at least a week, to thank God that his master has never been fully prepared at a psychological

moment to administer the punishment which he has so richly deserved.

As an exemplar, however, we must hold Mr. Creel to a strict accountability. But for the success, by way of personal advertisement, of his adventure into the field of fiction in translating official reports, it is most improbable that the Secretary of War would have imposed upon constructive critics the burden of re-establishing honesty as an admirable public policy. There is, too, little doubt that it is to Mr. Creel's original and nimble mind that Mr. Baker is indebted for his own sense of immunity to disapprobation, not merely of his official activities, but also of the conduct of allied public journals. As an illustration of the generous amplitude of his views in this connection, we may cite his comment upon the involuntary resignation of Dr. James A. B. Scherer, President of the Throop College of Technology and Chief Field Agent of the Council of National Defense. It will be recalled that Dr. Scherer became dissatisfied long ago with the attitude of the newspapers controlled by Mr. William Randolph Hearst toward the war and was accustomed to express his convictions with notable frankness and exceptional vigor. The circumstances which induced him to resign from the Council of National Defense were set forth by Dr. Scherer himself in a comprehensive letter to Mr. Baker in which he said he had received a visit from Mr. F. W. Kellogg of the *San Francisco Call*, who urged him to desist from attacking Mr. Hearst because, at the solicitation of "a member of the Cabinet," Mr. Hearst had become "good"; that "since the Hearst papers now support the Administration, they are therefore wholly loyal to our cause," and "that Roosevelt should be condemned rather than Hearst, seeing that the latter supports the Administration while the former frequently criticizes it." Dr. Scherer concluded as follows:

The next day I was officially informed that Mr. Kellogg had called at the War Office, and that when the Administration has decided on a policy everybody connected therewith must abide by it. What this policy is I already knew. For I am not the only offender. Another representative of the council at these recent war conferences has been complained of in a telegram from a Hearst agent for speaking (far less frequently and more mildly than I have done) in warning the people against the Hearst influence, and I had seen your memorandum, Mr. Secretary, attached to this telegram, instructing speakers that hereafter they must not indulge in discriminatory remarks as to the relative values of newspapers. This was officially sent to me, with the request

to "note and return." The language is diplomatic, but there can be no doubt as to its meaning.

Mr. Hearst now seeks to creep under the skirts of the Administration when an individual assails his newspapers for disloyalty, not to the "Administration," indeed, but to the Government itself as involved in the greatest war in our history; and, apparently, the skirt is uplifted to receive him. I resign, and so retain my freedom of speech and my right to keep the oath I took on entering the council—to give absolute allegiance to the Government, and to protect and defend it against all of its enemies, domestic and foreign.

Mr. Baker promptly issued this rejoinder:

Someone, I believe a representative of one of the Hearst papers, had told me that a representative of the Council of National Defense was making addresses and spending a lot of his time criticizing in harsh terms the Hearst newspapers. I told Mr. Gifford (Director of the Defense Council) that I thought nobody who was officially representing the Government ought to be criticizing any newspapers, I don't care whether it is Hearst's paper or anybody else's, and that while I hadn't the slightest desire to prevent any man expressing his individual opinion upon any newspaper, I didn't think that any man as a representative of the Government ought to be criticizing any newspaper.

Whether Mr. Baker would have taken this position if the newspapers concerned had been "disloyal to the Administration but not to the Government itself" instead of the reverse, according to Dr. Scherer's view, must remain a matter of speculation. The odd distinction drawn by Mr. Kellogg, who conducted the negotiations between the Administration and Mr. Hearst, between Mr. Hearst and Mr. Roosevelt would seem, however, to afford an indication. The *World* clearly had such an one in mind when, on November 23, 1917, replying to the *Evening Post*, after decrying "many foolish things" done by Lord Northcliffe and Mr. Roosevelt, it said:

But nobody can question their patriotism. Nobody can doubt their ardent sympathy with the cause of the Allies and their whole-hearted devotion to the cause for which the Allies are fighting. Whatever they do, they are not working for the Kaiser. If the *Evening Post* can see no difference between criticism that is loyal in spirit and criticism that is flagrantly disloyal in spirit, it needs an intellectual guardian.

If any differences upon this point still exist between the Administration and its chief newspaper sponsor prior to the acquirement of goodness by Mr. Hearst, we trust that they may be speedily reconciled, conformably to custom, through the kind offices of Mr. Bayard Swope.

The only further point worthy of slight passing notice is that, simultaneously with his insistence that no "representative of the Government ought to be criticizing any newspaper," Mr. Baker himself was writing to Representative Shallenberger of our own humble *War Weekly*:

I have read with deep appreciation and pleasure your helpful part in the debate on the Army bill. The country will be stirred by the fine absence of partisanship and by the significant facts which you cited, and I am of course doubly grateful at your willingness to defend me against the strange and malignant attack of Mr. Harvey.

It matters some to me personally, but my chief thought is that the truth will give the people of the country confidence in the Army, and in that way Mr. Harvey will be prevented from helping our country's enemies by his extraordinary and depressing lack of information.

To what extent the country has been "stirred by the fine absence of partisanship" in the harangue of a pacifist Democrat, seeking to curry favor with the Administration, we are not informed; all we really know is that, since we proved conclusively in the aforementioned journal that the most "significant fact" adduced in defense of Mr. Baker was an unqualified falsehood, Mr. Shallenberger has maintained a highly becoming reticence. That Mr. Baker should regard an attack from this source upon himself as "strange" is not surprising; in his haste he errs; none has ever been made; it is not he but what he has done occasionally, or failed to do usually, that has evoked our chiding from time to time. Nor do we resent in the slightest degree the term "malignant" as one of approbrium. We realize that Mr. Baker speaks with the exactitude of a scholar and the erudition of a lawyer. If he makes his derivation from the use of *malignantes* in the Vulgate, he has the authority of Swift for classifying us with the Church of England, but we regard it as more likely that he followed the Latin and unconsciously heeded the definition implied by Dr. Argyll in his *Reign of Law*, to wit:

The loving may become malignant; the simple-minded may become suspicious.

We find either classification quite acceptable, although in the circumstances and making due note of the contrast, the latter seems more apt and is probably the one intended.

That Mr. Baker should confuse himself with the Army is but natural; as we have already hinted, it was the logical and probably irresistible effect of the example of Mr. Creel

in holding himself to be both government and country. Our readers need not be informed that, instead of “attacking the Army,” we have persistently demanded from Mr. Baker justice and consideration for our gallant soldiers.

What we have really deplored more than anything else is the very “extraordinary and depressing lack of information” to which Mr. Baker *naïvely* refers,—to the withholding by an Administration pledged to publicity of full news and the whole truth. As Mr. Wilson (Mr. McLandburgh Wilson) says in *Life*:

Give us the news, whatsoever may happen,  
Glorious triumph or gloom of defeat;  
Dare not, presume not with heartstrings to meddle,  
Thinking to temper the tension and beat.  
Give us the news!

Give us the news of the boys who have left us;  
Hold not the worst from the gaze of our eyes.  
Think you that we who have sired them that battle  
Lack for the strength from disaster to rise?  
Give us the news!

Give us the news of our fighters, our children;  
Tell us the whole, nor from sorrow refrain.  
Think you that we who have borne them that suffer  
Know not the way to be valiant in pain?  
Give us the news!

Give us the news whatsoever may happen,  
Victory joyful or loss in the fray;  
Keep not the cup the Almighty has poured us.  
God is the censor—stand out of the way.  
Give us the news!

It took our friends in England a long time to realize this great need of a democracy at war. As Mr. Asquith said in a public speech the other day:

What, then, is our duty at the present moment? What are the faculties that we most need? Courage, of course, and patience—the courage that can face facts and can not only dare but endure; patience that cannot be driven from its equipoise by any alternations either of hope or of fear. These are, to quote Burke’s epithet, “the inbred qualities of our race.” But let me suggest one or two ways in which they may be helped and fortified. In the first place, let us be able to feel, whatever comes or goes, that we know the truth and the whole truth. (Cheers.) No one realizes more clearly than I do, who was answerable for the country at the beginning of the war, and for nearly



two and a half years for the conduct of the war, no one can realize more clearly the delicacy of the task of determining what at any given moment ought to be disclosed and what ought to be kept back. But in my judgment we have reached a stage of the war when far more is to be gained than is to be lost by laying before our own people all the actualities, be they favorable or adverse, of an unexampled situation. (Loud cheers.) The British people, not only here at home but throughout the length and breadth of the Empire, are ready to face, not only with a clean conscience but with clear eyes and with cool nerves, any and every conjuncture of circumstances.

There is no reason, there never was less reason, why the voice of honest and patriotic criticism should be hushed into silence, but let us keep our eyes fixed and our hearts set on the great dominating purposes to which we have deliberately consecrated the resources and the energies of the Empire, with an unwavering faith both in the worthiness of our aims and in the certainty that they will be achieved. (Cheers.)

There speaks the voice of experience. We commend it to the earnest consideration of those in direct authority, along with Buckle's famous saying that "the great enemy of knowledge"—and of successful warfare—"is not error, but inertness. All that we want is discussion, and then we are sure to do well, no matter what our blunders may be. One error conflicts with another; each destroys its opponent, and truth is evolved."

Truth! truth! the whole truth! That is what we have not had. That is what we must have. That is what we are going to have,—let the chips from the axe of criticism, constructive or destructive, fall where they may, with full appreciation of the pertinence of the quoted adage that—

*"To attain ideals, you must at times smash idols."*

## ALLIES IN REAL ALLIANCE

THERE is yet need of a more perfect union among the Allies, particularly between America and the others. By this we do not mean that monstrous bugaboo of petty parochialism, "entangling alliances." There may be no need of written treaties and technical engagements which might at some time prove embarrassing. But there is an urgent need of a much closer union between this country and its Allies in the three fundamental and essential respects of Information, Conference, and Co-operation.

There is need, first of all, of a comprehensive, intelligent and judicious American propaganda, among both the allied

and the neutral nations, which shall assure them adequate popular information of our purposes and proceedings. This need has been too much overlooked here, because there is so much less need of any such propaganda of our Allies among us. We have too much ignored the great contrast between America and European countries in the matter of popular knowledge of foreign affairs. Through our own sources of information we have a pretty adequate knowledge of the state of affairs among the people of our Allies. We know their condition, their purposes, their actual doings. Yet despite the completeness of our information, their Governments have gone to the trouble of adding thereto an informative propaganda immeasurably in excess of all that we have advanced to them.

On the other hand, there has been and still is a most deplorable and mischievous lack of correct information in Europe concerning America. A single example will suffice to indicate it. Last fall one of the chief causes of the dreadful Italian debacle between the Isonzo and the Piave was the misinformation concerning America which was disseminated among the Italian troops and populace by hostile German propagandists. The Italians were told that no help in the war could be expected from America; that while this country might help France and England, it would do nothing for Italy; that Italians in America were being oppressed and enslaved, and were being drafted into the army to fight in France and Flanders to the neglect of Italy; and other falsehoods still more preposterous. It may seem extraordinary to us that these things were believed, and that the Italian Government did not or could not effectively contradict and counteract them; though it would seem less remarkable if we took into account the difference between Italian conditions and our own. The fact is that they were believed, and that they had the mischievous effect which their authors intended.

Indeed, preposterous as they seem to us, those falsehoods appeared quite plausible to those to whom they were addressed. No American troops were being sent to Italy, and there was no talk of any being sent thither; nor were troops from any other of the Allied nations landed on Italian shores. Moreover, we were making no effort to inform the Italians of our purposes, but were leaving them to suffer, in their lack of information, from whatever insidious and mendacious attacks the Hunnish propagandists might make upon them.

In such circumstances it was not so strange that they were deluded and seduced as it would have been had such not been the case. It is not too much to say that if the Italian people and the Italian army had known the truth concerning America, that disastrous retreat from the Isonzo to the Piave would never have occurred.

A prime need is, then, an efficient American propaganda of information in every country that we can reach and enter with it. That need is immeasurably greater than the need of domestic propaganda. It is doubtless well to have a Bureau of Publicity, though it would be far better to have it directed by someone who was not an egregious and grotesque misfit. But if half the effort and expense which Mr. Creel wastes here in utterly unnecessary work, and in work which our own newspaper press would be glad and eager to do far more efficiently than he can if only it were permitted to do so,—if that, we say, were spent abroad in properly directed propaganda among the Allied and neutral nations, immeasurably more valuable results would be obtained.

The second great need is that of more intimate and authoritative Conference. There is a Supreme Allied War Council, which meets at intervals in Paris. It held its seventh session, for example, on July 5. France was represented by Clemenceau, the Prime Minister; by Pichon, the Foreign Minister; and by General Foch, the Generalissimo. Great Britain was represented by Mr. Lloyd George, the Prime Minister; by Mr. Balfour, the Foreign Secretary; by Lord Milner, the Secretary for War; by Sir Douglas Haig, Field Marshal; and by Sir Henry Wilson, Major General. And the United States was represented by General John J. Pershing and probably General Bliss.

Now we insist that that was not adequate American representation. In saying that there is no reflection upon General Pershing. It is no disrespect nor depreciation of him to say that he is a soldier, pure and simple. He has had no experience in statesmanship or diplomacy, and he is invested with no authority in such matters. We have the fullest confidence in his ability to deal with any purely military matters that come before the Council. But there are other matters, diplomatic, political, financial, and what not.

Suppose, for example, the question of intervention in Russia to come before the Council—as it should have come long ago, for definitive decision and action. General

Pershing would be amply competent to discuss its military aspects. But still more important are its diplomatic, political and economic aspects; which are, as we have been assured, those most seriously regarded at Washington. The French, British and Italian Prime Ministers, the Foreign Ministers, the War Ministers and others, would be competent to consider those aspects with plenary information and authority. But it would obviously be too much to expect of General Pershing that he alone could do so comparably with them. If he could, he would be a phenomenal super-man who should forthwith be made Universal Dictator of all the Allied Powers.

Bear in mind, too, that these other plural representatives of the Allied Governments are closer to their homes and in direct touch with their colleagues and constituencies, while the solitary American is, in Secretary Baker's phrase, three thousand miles away from his base of authority. Because of that difference in distance there is manifestly all the greater need of a larger and more authoritative American representation in the Council. If General Foch were alone, he could at any moment consult the Prime Minister or Foreign Minister or War Minister. If Sir Douglas Haig were alone, he could do the same. But General Pershing is not and cannot be thus in constant touch with Washington.

It would of course be impracticable for President Wilson and his Secretaries of State and War to attend the meetings of the Council; though if they did, the United States would be no more numerous and authoritatively represented there than Great Britain is in the presence of Messrs. George and Balfour and Lord Milner. But it would be practicable, and it seems to us that it would be eminently desirable, for this country to send to the Council two or three statesmen of commanding rank and plenary authority, as representatives of the diplomatic and administrative departments of our Government. In that way the United States would have the voice to which it is fairly entitled in the deliberations of the Council, and would be brought into the complete administrative and executive accord with its Allies which is essential to the most efficient prosecution of the war and the most successful disposition of the great issues incident to and conditional upon the war.

The supplying of these two needs of Information and Conference would lead—and nothing else could so surely and

readily lead—to the supplying of the third and supreme need of Co-operation. It is admirable to have complete military co-operation on the immediate battle front, under a single Generalissimo. We were recently informed that a perfect agreement had been reached on all points at a military conference between French and American officers, over questions of Franco-American co-operation. That was gratifying and reassuring, though it should have been the veriest matter of course that such an agreement would be reached and would be maintained. Obviously, anything short of complete co-operation in military affairs during the war would be madness. There must be only one policy for all the Allied armies. That is axiomatic.

But there is no less need of equally complete agreement and co-operation in other than military affairs—in economics, finance, and diplomacy—and in such affairs for a period after the war as well as during the war. For there is and can be no divorcement of civil from military affairs. The armies do not wage war alone. They must be backed up and fortified by civil operations, industrial, commercial and financial; by the political policies of the belligerent nations; and by their diplomatic transactions. It would not do for one Ally to ignore food conservation, for example, while the others were strictly practising it. It would not do for one Ally to maintain friendly diplomatic, commercial or other relations with a Power with which the others were at war, or to refuse to join in some international action upon which all the others were agreed and in which they were engaged. (If it be said that this has been done, and is still being done, then we must say, so much the worse for the Power that has done and is doing it!)

Nor, as we have already said, is such co-operation to end with the war. Lord Reading, speaking at the recent Harvard Commencement, dwelt with convincing eloquence upon the need of continued co-operation after the war, between Great Britain and America, for mutual aid in that great work of world-wide reconstruction which must then be undertaken and which, we may be sure, will be sufficient to engross the attention of the Allies for many years. For the world cannot automatically go back to the old ways, as it has done after other wars. It can never go back to them. It will of necessity enter upon a new era, presenting a greater contrast to all that has gone before than any other era which has ever

come upon it. The changes caused by the fall of Rome, by the Reformation, by the French Revolution, or by the revolutionary era of 1848, will hereafter seem small indeed by the side of those which will inevitably follow the World War.

In the formulation and direction of the new order of affairs it will be not only fitting but indeed imperative for the Allied Powers to take the initiative and to exercise control. They are fighting this war for democracy, for freedom, for humanity, and it will be incumbent upon them not merely to win the immediate victory but equally to safeguard for the future the results attained. It would be the maddest of self-stultification to win the victory and then to sacrifice its fruits. And just as in peace it is necessary, unless we are pacifists or fools or creels, to be prepared for war, so is it necessary even while we are in the very thick of the war to be prepared for the peace which is to come. We cannot too persistently keep in mind nor too strongly emphasize the fact of our coming co-operation with our Allies in the work of peace-making and of peace-preserving, nor can we too sedulously cultivate the relationships, the disposition, and the general ways and means, which will most conduce to the successful achievement of those tremendous tasks. We can imagine nothing more discreditable than that, having won the victory over the Hun, the Allies should quarrel or even disagree among themselves over the results. Doubtless German propaganda will be busy, and is even now busy, toward that end. But it is simply unthinkable that such a calamity should be realized. And nothing can be more certain than that the surest way to avoid such dishonor, and the surest way to guarantee unhesitating and ungrudging agreement and co-operation after the war, is for all the Allies during the war to cultivate continually the habit of confident community of counsel, of thought, and of aim.

An auspicious step toward the attainment of such an end was recently taken in the institution of a new department or bureau of the French Government, charged directly with the administration of Franco-American co-operation in the war. In that there was a suggestion upon which our own Government might well act, and act in an enlarged scope. Amid all our multitudinous bureaus and commissionships and administratorships and boards there might well be one, of the very highest personality and authority, devoted expressly to the promotion and effective administration of co-opera-

tion between this country and not France alone but all of our Allies, and not for the period of actual war alone but also for the post-bellum period of readjustment and reconstruction.

It will scarcely answer to say that such work is already provided for through other channels, through General Pershing in the Supreme War Council, through our various ambassadors, and through the versatile and ubiquitous Colonel House. The same might as well have been said of those other functions and duties for which the creation of special agencies has been found necessary. Work done through a multiplicity of independent agencies can never be co-ordinated and unified as this work supremely needs to be. Nor would it be just or profitable to impose such a task, exacting, onerous and of unsurpassed gravity, upon any existing officer or department of the Government. All are understood to be already fully taxed with their regular duties without assuming others that would be new and strange and burdensome. And if any new work is of sufficient importance to deserve special administration, and that by the most expert and accomplished statesmanship at the Government's command, it assuredly is that of perfecting, maintaining, and practically exercising co-operation with our Allies. In such fashion, and thus alone, is the grand alliance for democracy and civilization against autocracy and the Huns to be made not a mere formal technicality but a vital and victorious fact.

### A FOOTNOTE TO AUSTRIAN HISTORY

"EVEN Austria," says Viscount Grey in his pamphlet on the proposed League of Nations, "has publicly shown a disposition to accept the proposal, and probably welcomes it genuinely, though secretly, as a safeguard for her future, not only against old enemies but against Prussian domination."

A well authenticated footnote to recent Austrian history will indicate how "genuinely" any action of the Hapsburg monarchy may safely be regarded as taken. It may also serve as a suggestion of the degree to which Viscount (then Sir Edward) Grey was made the unconscious victim of Austrian duplicity in the early years of his Foreign Secretaryship, a condition of which some traces still seem to linger,

in the words which we have quoted. Nor is it without interest as a gloss upon the more than whispered imputation of Austrian official complicity with the tragedy of Sarajevo which was the ostensible pretext of the war.

It is a commonplace of history that ever since the Congress of Berlin in 1878 Austria has cherished the design of absorbing Serbia and much of Macedonia and thus gaining a frontage on the Aegean Sea at Salonika. It was in the furtherance of that scheme that she annexed the Serbian provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina and resisted both secretly and openly all efforts of Serbia to gain an outlet to the sea, either on the Aegean or the Adriatic. Nor did she scruple to regard with complacency—if not to desire with avidity—a war between Great Britain and Germany as likely to afford her an opportunity of achieving her end. Indeed, such conquest of Serbia was only a part of a grandiose ambition which comprised the seizure of Poland and Roumania, the dissolution of Russia, the deposition of the Hohenzollern dynasty from the headship of the Teutonic world, and the re-establishment of the Holy Roman Empire under the Hapsburg crown.

When the Conservative-Unionist Government was in power in Great Britain, with Lord Lansdowne as Foreign Secretary, British official sympathy was at least not pro-Austrian, and might have become decidedly anti-Austrian. Such was the estimate of it which was formed by Prince Lazarovich-Hrebelianovich, of Serbia, when he went to London in 1901 as the official delegate of the Macedonian Committee, to combat pro-Austrian and pro-Turkish influences and if possible to win the Government over to a pro-Serbian or rather pro-Balkan policy. In his mission the Prince had the valuable assistance of that shrewd and far-seeing British statesman, Sir Henry Drummond Wolff, since deceased, and there was an encouraging prospect of success.

But when the Conservative-Unionist Government gave place to the Liberals, and Sir Edward Grey became Foreign Secretary, there came a radical change. Austrian influence at the British Court became supreme. This was largely because of the warm personal friendship which existed between Edward VII and the Austro-Hungarian Ambassador, Count Mensdorff, as well as between the King and the Austrian heir-presumptive. We must also, of course, attribute it in part to the impressible disposition of Sir Edward



Grey and the ease with which he was imposed upon by the wily Austrian. In consequence of these things Edward VII was drawn into—and was even regarded by many as the author of—the so-called encircling policy, which was to isolate Germany from the rest of Europe by means of a chain of alliances into which Austria professed always to be ready to enter.

What the real feelings and real designs of Austria were, as now apparent to the world, Prince Lazarovich had occasion to learn at Berlin in February, 1906, at the time of the Algeciras Conference on Morocco, during his conversations with some of the men who then guided and who still guide the destinies of the German Empire. As related by him in a forthcoming publication, at the very time when the Austrian Ambassador at London was inciting Great Britain to hostility toward Germany and striving to precipitate a war between those Powers, the Austrian Ambassador at Berlin, Count Sögyeny-Marich, played the part of informer, "convincing Germany of the danger which threatened her from England, pointing to Austria's loyalty, putting always to the fore Germany's paramount interest in supporting Austria's aspirations in the Near East, even at the expense of the commercial interests of individual Germans. (The German Consul-General at Belgrade was even recalled because he encouraged Serbian merchants to buy their goods in Germany instead of in Austria.) In these representations at Berlin the Austrian Ambassador was powerfully supported by the Bavarians and Centrist party in the German Reichstag, which for the last twenty years had been entirely directed from Vienna and one of whose leaders is the well-known Ultramontane intriguer, Mathias Erzberger."

Two months later came an incident which fully demonstrated the purpose of the Hapsburg-Ultramontane clique to plunge Europe into a general war. It is an incident of peculiar interest to Americans, not merely because of its exposure of almost incredible Austrian turpitude, but also because its purport was balked by the vigorous efforts of an American newspaper man, who was then able to avert for a time the colossal catastrophe which eight years later engulfed the world.

In 1906 the general situation in Europe seemed favorable to the Austrian scheme of conquest. Russia had just made peace with Japan after a costly and disastrous war and was

in the throes of domestic reorganization after almost revolutionary disorders within the empire. Germany was at least sufficiently prepared for war to face it without hesitation, should occasion present itself. And unscrupulous Austrian ingenuity was quite ready to provide the occasion. Kaiser Wilhelm was well known to be peculiarly sensitive on the subject of regicide. Three years before he had been convulsed with horror and detestation at the killing of King Alexander and Queen Draga at Belgrade, and it was shrewdly reckoned that another such tragedy would be sufficient to provoke him into taking such action as would make war inevitable.

Now the regicide of 1903, while committed by Serbian army officers, had been brought about through the machinations of the secret agents of the Hapsburgs, and it was believed that the same agencies would easily be able to effect its substantial repetition. In the spring of 1906, therefore, an Austrian plot was organized to oust King Peter of Serbia from his throne, which, it was expected and even desired, would involve the assassination of him and his family.

This precious conspiracy, according to Prince Lazarovich, was forwarded by Count Mensdorff, the Austrian Ambassador at London, through whose machinations an attempt was made to compromise the British Government so as to involve that country in war with Germany; that being, of course, an essential part of the whole scheme. To that end, the Hapsburg propagandists caused rumors to be set afloat from time to time, in the devious sub-currents of hearsay, in occasional paragraphs in the press, and even in some anonymous books, to the effect that the Serbs would willingly exchange their old King for some member of the British royal family. These rumors were discreetly brought to the attention of influential men in Germany, and of course added much to the disfavor and suspicion with which Great Britain was already regarded in that country. There is some reason for supposing that Prince Mirko of Montenegro and his wife, the latter being a distant relative of the former King Alexander, had knowledge of the plot, though to what extent is not quite clear. At any rate, the Montenegrin court was counted upon to play a very important part in the drama.

For at that time the King and Queen of England were planning to pay a visit to Montenegro during their spring cruise in the Mediterranean, and with devilish cunning it

was arranged to have the *coup d'état* at Belgrade, which would doubtless involve the murder of King Peter, occur at the very time when Edward VII was a guest at the Montenegrin court. That coincidence, taken in connection with the former rumors about an English successor to the Serbian throne, would, it was thought, place Great Britain in such a light in the eyes of Germany that war between those two countries would be inevitable; of which war Austria, playing the part of a jackal between two fighting lions, would reap the benefits.

Prince Lazarovich was at this time in London, where, only about eight days before King Edward was to reach Montenegro, he learned what was being plotted at Vienna and what was to happen at Belgrade. A war between Great Britain and Germany thus seemed inevitable, and a general European war quite probable; and time in which to frustrate the Hapsburg devilry was painfully short. He immediately informed Sir Henry Drummond Wolff of the facts, and also Mr. H. R. Chamberlain, now deceased, who was then the chief European correspondent of *The New York Sun* and also of the Laffan telegraphic news agency. The three conferred together. They realized the extreme seriousness of the situation, and of course agreed that all possible means must be used to prevent the threatened catastrophe.

It seemed almost hopeless to undertake deterrent action in London in time. The King and Queen and Foreign Secretary were already sailing toward Cattigue and could not, of course, be recalled. It was decided, therefore, to lay the matter before the German Kaiser himself, as the one man in Europe who would be able to prevent the execution of the plot. His veto, and his alone, would be effective at Vienna. This was done, and at the same time Mr. Chamberlain made the fullest possible use of the Laffan agency to the same end. It might seem invidious to declare whether the Kaiser or the news agency proved the more powerful. What is certain is that together they effected the desired purpose. King Edward suddenly "changed his plans" and did not visit Montenegro, while various more or less mysterious gentlemen who had been visiting Belgrade and familiarizing themselves with the precincts of the Royal Palace suddenly departed from the Serbian capital for a holiday in the Tyrolean Alps. And the war was postponed for eight years; until

another royal or imperial assassination conveniently occurred.

A brief sequel to this extraordinary incident remains to be told. Prince Lazarovich was convinced that in political and diplomatic affairs the cause of Serbia and indeed of the Balkans generally was seen in Great Britain only through Austrian eyes. He then undertook to enlist British interest in the economic and commercial development of Serbia through the project of a canal from the Danube to the Aegean Sea by way of the Vardar River and its valley, a project at that time only in its inception. But here, too, he found British statesmen and financiers strongly under the influence of Vienna; to an extent which rendered his efforts in behalf of that enterprise altogether vain.

It then occurred to Prince Lazarovich that the canal project might be made to appeal favorably to certain powerful financial interests in Germany, which might take it up as an offset to the war intrigues of the Hapsburgs and Ultramontanes. Austria, he was sure, would not venture upon a war single-handed. She needed the support of Germany, or at least needed to have Germany and Great Britain at war. He accordingly approached some very important financiers in Germany, by whom he was at first favorably received. He was indeed encouraged to hope that German financial and commercial interests would become so strong in that region as to necessitate the blocking and abandonment of Austria's schemes of conquest.

Accordingly, in 1907, when the time seemed propitious for a further and definite step in that direction, his associate, Mr. V. R. Savich—who is now Serbian Commissioner at Washington—undertook to form among the younger men a group with an economic programme which would warrant the asking of either Great Britain or Germany such support of the economic and political development of Serbia as would give that country a satisfactory guarantee against any further Austrian aggression. "I forwarded this programme to Berlin," says Prince Lazarovich, "after having first urged it in London. A few days later word came that my letter would be answered in the Reichstag. And so it was. Prince Buelow, the German Chancellor, himself gave the answer in a speech before the Reichstag, answering the letter practically point for point and closing his speech by saying that 'in regard to Serbia, Germany is bound to and will support only the interests of Austria.' That closed the chapter com-

pletely and fully. And I knew henceforth what the future held in store for Serbia."

The apprehensions which were then aroused were fulfilled in 1914, in the carrying out of the identical programme, *mutatis mutandis*, that the Hapsburg conspirators had concocted eight years before. To the very letter Germany in that year fulfilled the declaration of her Chancellor in 1907, that she was bound to the interests of Austria in Serbia, and would support them. But the tortuous and treacherous course which Austria has pursued, especially toward Great Britain, provokes much wonder at the charity and credulity of an eminent British statesman who, having himself been the victim of that course, can still regard the sincerity of Austria with any degree of confidence.

## WAR MEASURES FOR WAR TIMES

TRITE as the admonition may seem, it is never amiss to remind ourselves that war measures are for war times alone. Just as pacifism is detestable when war is being waged, so are the ways and means of war objectionable in time of peace. This is realized by all men without argument, to a certain extent. Military rule, courts martial for civilians, or the use of the army in civil affairs, would not for a moment be tolerated. But many who readily recognize this appear to be oblivious of the fact that there may be war measures entirely apart from the army, which are just as inappropriate in time of peace as would be intervention by the military forces.

A practical illustration of this, and a practical opportunity of applying the principle, arose in the recent discussion in Congress of the President's request for authority to take the telegraph and telephone systems of the country under Government control. In that request the only prescription of time was, that the thing should be done immediately. There was no thought of limiting the endurance of the new order of affairs. Thereupon a resolution to that effect was introduced and earnestly urged: for granting that power to the President for an indefinite period, which would mean in perpetuity, in the absence of any positive action to the contrary. To this, however, although it was favored by the President and by three of the Cabinet officers who stand

closest to him, the majority of the House committee would not assent. They declined even to sanction the granting of power to control the lines for six months or any other period after the war, but insisted upon limiting the exercise of Government control to the period of the duration of the war; so that with the ending of the war that control would automatically cease and the lines would be restored to the management of their owners.

In that we must regard the majority of the committee as having been quite right, and as having performed an important public service. We have no knowledge of the motives of the President and his Cabinet officers, or of the minority of the committee, in seeking to make the control perpetual, or at least unlimited, nor are we inclined to explore them. Our esteem of "unlimited" schemes from certain sources has not been enhanced by recent developments of the plan for an "unlimited" increase of the army. But it must be plain to every intelligent and thoughtful man what the inevitable result of such an unlimited grant would be.

It would be, to make as difficult as possible the return to the normal *ante bellum* conditions, by throwing upon the advocates of such a return the onus of securing special legislation to that effect. It would make necessary positive action by Congress for the withdrawal of the lines from Government control, action as positive as that of placing them under that control. It would, indeed, assume Government control to be the normal condition, which should not be interrupted or changed except for cause, the urgency of which must be proved. It would be to treat as a perpetual condition in time of restored peace something which had been adopted solely as a war measure and which had been acquiesced in by the nation on the ground of military necessity alone. And that is something which we could not but regard as ominously vicious.

It is a wise and prudent provision of the Constitution that Congress, while it has full power to raise and support armies, shall make no appropriation of money for that purpose for a longer period than two years. It cannot even make a stated annual appropriation for the period of duration of the war. That should be an efficient reminder of the fact that war is always to be regarded as a temporary condition and that all measures adopted for its prosecution are to be similarly regarded as temporary. Of course the analogy between

military appropriations and Government control of corporate enterprises is by no means perfect; but so far as there is a difference between the two cases, the presumption and the argument for strict limitation to war time are much stronger in the latter than in the former.

We are not impressed by the suggestion or contention of some that the period of Government control needs to be extended indefinitely, or even for some considerable specified time, such as a year, or six months, beyond the duration of the war, in order to give opportunity for preparations and readjustments incident to the change, and we think that the majority of the committee was quite right in rejecting such proposals and in insisting that the period of Government control be limited strictly by the duration of the war. No such time is required for such preparations before the taking over of properties by the Government, and none, beyond a few days or even hours, is granted. There should be no more need of any in the case of the relinquishment of such control, unless we are to assume the discreditable proposition that Government management is much less efficient and business-like than private management. As a matter of fact, if such time were needed, it would be automatically provided, since there is always warning given of the impending return of peace.

It is, of course, conceivable that the advocates of the unlimited grant of Government control are in favor of perpetual Government control and ownership. That is their right. Even if the President and his Cabinet favored such a policy, that would be their right. But in that case they should have the courage of their convictions to make a direct proposal to that effect, and to make a direct issue of it. What we object to at present is the use of "military necessity" as a stalking-horse, behind which to secure the enactment of laws for which there is no military necessity whatever, and which would have no chance whatever of acceptance without such a screen. There may be military necessity for the Government's taking over the railroads and telegraphs, and ice-cream saloons and peanut stands, too, for all we know. But we are not willing to admit that there could be any military necessity for it after military operations had ceased and peace had been restored; and we object to the doing or the continuation of anything for the sake of military necessity when that necessity no longer exists.

In a more general sense, our objection is to the doing of things by indirection, and of taking advantage of the war thus to do things which could not be done in time of peace on their own merits. A similar trick was tried in foisting a prohibition " rider " upon an agricultural bill, and other such performances may be again and again repeated. They are contrary to sound policy, and might easily become pernicious and a menace to the Republic.

Whatever measures are necessary for the successful prosecution of the war, let us have them proposed and voted upon squarely, as war measures and nothing more.

## OUR DEBT TO HUN PROFESSORS

THE learned Herr Professors of the land of the unspeakable Hun are again making us their debtors. Once more we have to thank them for a clear and vigorous presentation of Hun aims and aspirations. For some time these mouthpieces of that which is highest in Teutonic learning and ideals have been more or less silent. But they were not demobilized by any means. And now again they have entered the fray, and entered it apparently refreshed and reinvigorated in their bristling belligerency.

They want to hear no talk of peace. Their voice is all for war. Not only for war, but for war waged on those true cave dweller Hun principles which so irresistibly appeal to the Teutonic heart. The *Suddeutsche Monatsheft*, a monthly publication, devotes a large portion of a recent issue exclusively to these professional outgivings. This particular scholastic campaign seems to be taking the form of a massed assault on peace-theorists. Professor Spahn, of the University of Strasbourg, is one of the leaders in it. He says:

The need of the present hour is not yet universal peace and rule of law and freedom of peoples, but clearness about the vital conditions of the German people as a state and about the full development of our own state of existence. Unity must be based upon the leadership of the most efficient people. Only a race so full of idealism as the Germans is capable of lighting the horizon of humanity with an idea so great and so eternal.

For nearly four years now the Huns have been illuminating the horizon of humanity with the light of burning homes, hospitals, churches and stately cathedrals, historical monu-



ments which even mediæval savagery had spared. And all this to the accompaniment of the despairing shrieks of ravished wives, mothers, daughters and even little kindergarten school girls; of wantonly maimed and butchered aged men and women and helpless children; of wretched creatures of both sexes and all ages torn away from what before the Hun blight fell had been for generations homes of peace and contentment nestled away among smiling fields and amid gardens of radiant flowers.

This is as it should be according to the chief authorities in all that is highest in Teutonic refinement. This is that light on the horizon of humanity which the learned Hun instructors from the security of their cloistered seclusion are proclaiming as the German idealism without which all discussions of peace are Utopian dreams.

Not that these views are peculiar to the academic bodies of that barbarous and besotted nation. They are the views proclaimed in Germany for decades, while preparation was being made for their practical application in the present war—views glorified and consecrated as dogmas of national faith by all classes, from the physically and mentally deformed monster who sits on the throne to the dumb, driven cannon-fodder cattle who for generations have been taught to cower and cringe under the brutally merciless military lash. The learned professors are the chosen evangelists of the hell-inspired creed—that's all.

We cannot be too thankful that they do from time to time thus give it utterance. We cannot too often have brought home to us just what the hideous monster is that we are fighting. The oftener we are reminded from these high authoritative sources that either we win this war or we lose a world that is fit to live in—the oftener the Herr Professors bring that tremendous fact home to us; the more they labor to prevent us from forgetting it for a single moment in all the stir and bustle of these eventful days, the more they increase our everlasting indebtedness to them. They have let their baleful Hun light so shine before men that all around the humanity horizon we see their foul works and know them for what they are. They are light to our feet, an inspiration to us in our unswervable purpose to wage a war of extermination on their hideous creed and upon all its exponents and apostles.